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ABSTRACT
The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) emphasises that cost-effectiveness is not the only consideration in
health technology appraisal and is increasingly explicit about other factors considered relevant but not the weight attached to each.
The objective of this study is to investigate the inﬂuence of cost-effectiveness and other factors on NICE decisions and
whether NICE’s decision-making has changed over time.
We model NICE’s decisions as binary choices for or against a health care technology in a speciﬁc patient group. Inde-
pendent variables comprised of the following: clinical and economic evidence; characteristics of patients, disease or treat-
ment; and contextual factors potentially affecting decision-making. Data on all NICE decisions published by December
2011 were obtained from HTAinSite [www.htainsite.com].
Cost-effectiveness alone correctly predicted 82% of decisions; few other variables were signiﬁcant and alternative model
speciﬁcations had similar performance. There was no evidence that the threshold has changed signiﬁcantly over time. The
model with highest prediction accuracy suggested that technologies costing £40 000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QALY)
have a 50% chance of NICE rejection (75% at £52 000/QALY; 25% at £27 000/QALY).
Past NICE decisions appear to have been based on a higher threshold than £20 000–£30 000/QALY. However, this may
reﬂect consideration of other factors that cannot be easily quantiﬁed. © 2014 The Authors. Health Economics published by
John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. NICE decision-making
Health technology assessment (HTA) agencies’ decision-making criteria are important for health care pro-
viders, patients’ eligibility for health care and technology ﬁrms’ revenue and investment and production deci-
sions about current and potential products. Staﬁnski et al. (2011) note that although European countries’
centralised authorities state their criteria, “there remains a lack of transparency around critical elements, such
as how multiple factors or criteria are weighed during committee deliberations”.
The National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE) provides guidance on which health care inter-
ventions are available from the National Health Service (NHS) in England and Wales. Although NICE’s remit
and aims are deﬁned by its establishing legislation, NICE was allowed to develop its methods and processes,
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which have become increasingly stable and clear. However, areas of considerable uncertainty remain about
their decision-making criteria.
Rawlins and Culyer (2004) state that NICE’s main decision-making criterion is cost-effectiveness, usually
measured by the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) expressed as cost per quality-adjusted life-year
(QALY) gained. The ‘threshold’ ICER that determines whether a technology is cost-effective is intended to rep-
resent the opportunity cost to a ﬁxed-budget NHS of adopting a technology in terms of QALYs forgone (McCabe
et al., 2008; NICE, 2013). This ‘shadow price of a QALY’ is quantiﬁed but not as a single ‘threshold’. Instead,
ranges that affect the probability of recommending a technology are described. Although probability is invoked,
the actual probabilities are not quantiﬁed. However, Rawlins and Culyer (2004) suggested that a curve relating
increasing risk of rejection and log-ICER would be a sigmoid, with inﬂexion points at £5000–£15 000 and
£25 000–£35 000/QALY gained. The most recent and deﬁnitive statement by NICE (2013) is that technologies
costing < £20 000/QALY gained are normally considered cost-effective. Above £20 000/QALY, judgements
take account of uncertainty, innovation and whether there are non-health outcomes, end of life considerations
or stakeholder views that quality of life gains are inadequately captured; these increase in importance as ICERs
increase. Moreover, interventions for children, disadvantaged populations and severe diseases are treated more
favourably (NICE, 2008, 2009; Rawlins et al., 2010). However, it is explicitly said that some factors are not taken
into account, for example, orphan drugs for rare conditions (Littlejohns and Rawlins, 2009).
Appealing to probabilities rather than thresholds gives NICE considerable decision-making discretion and re-
duces challenges to its approach and to any precise value for the threshold. However, it generates uncertainty about
why particular decisions are made, which reduces NICE’s accountability and predictability of future decisions,
which may affect decisions about health technology research and development. The weights attached to other fac-
tors are also rarely quantiﬁed, and their impact/importance is therefore evenmore uncertain than cost-effectiveness.
In this paper, we explore the role of different criteria used in decision-making by a public body comprising
multiple committees, each comprising multiple individuals who weigh criteria up via a ‘deliberative process’
(Culyer, 2006, 2009; NICE, 2013). Such processes typically involve scientiﬁc evidence (both context-free
and context-sensitive) and ‘colloquial’ evidence (any other evidence that people use in making decisions).
The appraisal committee’s role is not to ensure correct application of an explicit decision-making formula
but to exercise judgement over available evidence, including that offered by its members. Criteria for
decision-making are equally non-explicit, involving a ‘search’ for them based on expert opinion, research
and accumulated experience (Culyer et al., 2007). Lack of clarity and deliberate non-explicitness add to the
importance of exposing implicit criteria and value judgements affecting public spending to public scrutiny
and assessing the extent to which society’s preferences are reﬂected by implied weights.
1.2. Previous research
This analytical framework was used in previous studies. Devlin and Parkin (2004) found that cost-effectiveness
was the key driver of NICE decisions, although uncertainty and burden of disease were also signiﬁcant. Dakin
et al. (2006) found that decisions were inﬂuenced by cost-effectiveness, clinical evidence, technology type, and
patient group submissions. Cerri et al. (2014) found that in addition to cost-effectiveness, demonstration of sta-
tistical superiority of the primary endpoint in clinical trials, the number of pharmaceuticals appraised within the
same appraisal and the appraisal year were also important.
Similar approaches have been used to analyse other HTA bodies’ decisions. Linley and Hughes (2012),
Mshelia et al. (2013) and Harris et al. (2008) analysed decisions about new medicines by the All Wales
Medicines Strategy Group, the Scottish Medicines Consortium and the Australian Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts
Advisory Committee, respectively. Each found that criteria in addition to cost-effectiveness signiﬁcantly affected
decisions. In contrast, Tappenden et al. (2007) used a stated preference approach to explore how important decision
criteria are to NICE committee members; signiﬁcant variables included the ICER, uncertainty, availability of other
therapies, and severity of illness.
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1.3. Aims
This paper assesses the impact of NICE’s criteria on its decision-making in practice and estimates the weights
given to different criteria implicit within NICE technology appraisal (TA) decisions. We investigate empirically
the effect of different factors on the likelihood of NICE recommending a technology, using a revealed prefer-
ence approach to model decision-making, building on and extending earlier studies (Devlin and Parkin, 2004;
Dakin et al., 2006; Cerri et al., 2014). In particular, the much larger number of decisions now available facil-
itate exploration of additional research questions and examine changes over time. Statements about thresholds
have evolved in subtle yet important ways: initially, an ‘unwritten rule’ of £30 000; then descriptions as lying
between £20 000 and £30 000 (NICE, 2005); ﬁnally, references to £20 000 with exceptions (NICE, 2008,
2013). Key aspects of TA processes and methods have also evolved.
We used logistic regression to estimate binary econometric models predicting whether or not a technology
was recommended. Recommendations for whole TAs involve three alternatives: ‘yes’ to all patients and tech-
nologies considered; ‘no’ to all patients; and ‘restricted’ or ‘optimised’ (NICE, 2010), meaning ‘yes’ to some
patient subgroups and ‘no’ to others. Dakin et al. (2006) and Cerri et al. (2014) categorised recommendations
in this manner, but this has important limitations. The evidence considered in restricted recommendations may
differ between the patient subgroups for whom the technology is recommended or rejected, and the proportion
of patients accessing the technology varies considerably (O’Neill and Devlin, 2010). We therefore divide
restricted appraisals into their component yes/no decisions about the use of a single technology for a clearly
deﬁned group of patients. This enables us more precisely to link the decision to the evidence.
We aimed to address the following:
1. Does the probability of rejection increase with increasing ICER?
2. Are past NICE decisions consistent with NICE’s stated threshold range and/or Rawlins and Culyer’s
sigmoid curve?
3. Do other factors identiﬁed by NICE affect the rejection probability? Do factors that are said not to merit
special consideration affect it?
4. Have NICE’s decision criteria or threshold or both changed over time?
2. METHODS
2.1. Decisions included in the analysis
The data for this study were obtained from HTAinSite© (www.htainsite.com) and initially comprised all 240
NICE TAs published by 31 December 2011, with the exception of 11 appraisals that were terminated before
any decision was made (Figure 1).
Each of the 229 non-terminated TAs was subdivided into 1–19 component decisions, each representing a
NICE decision to either recommend or reject a single technology in a speciﬁc patient population. Subdivision
of each TA inevitably requires a degree of researcher judgement; our data set follows that of HTAinSite, which
uses a carefully documented protocol providing a set of principles for making those judgements consistently
(refer to Supporting Information).
Regression analyses focused on decisions with available, quantiﬁed cost/QALY estimates lying in the north-
east quadrant of the cost-effectiveness plane, where treatment is more effective and more costly than its com-
parator (refer to Sections 2.2 and 3.1).
2.2. Variables extracted and analysed
The conceptual judgements underpinning NICE appraisals that were outlined in Section 1 were used to select a
core set of variables for the ﬁrst regression model (model 1) from the ﬁelds available in HTAinSite (Table I). In
addition to the ICER, we included one variable indicating the amount of clinical evidence (Total_pts_in_RCTs)
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because previous work showed this to be important (Dakin et al., 2006) and a variable capturing any temporal
trends (Date). We also included one measure of stakeholder involvement (Pt_group_sub), whether the interven-
tion was the only treatment for this population, whether the decision concerned children and a crude measure of
disease severity. End of life considerations were not included in model 1 as such data are only available since
2009. Uncertainty around the ICER and innovation were not included in model 1 as a result of difﬁculties
deﬁning variables that consistently capture these issues.
However, HTAinSite did not provide all the data required for modelling. A key issue was identiﬁcation of
the ‘main’ ICER associated with each decision. HTAinSite records all ICERs mentioned in the TA documen-
tation. For our analysis, however, stronger value judgements were required to identify the ‘main’ ICER(s) that
drove NICE decisions. We developed a set of principles to guide our selection of the relevant ICERs (refer to
Supporting Information).
For 45% (229/510) of decisions with usable ICERs, we identiﬁed≥2 ICERs that informed NICE’s decision-
making. Taking the mean, median or midpoint of the reported ICERs would have made assumptions about how
NICE used this information in their decision-making. It would also have prevented us from including decisions
with ICERs ‘above £X’ and would overestimate the precision of our regression results by ignoring the uncer-
tainty around the ICER. Instead, we used a simulation approach to sample repeatedly (100 times) from the list
of ICERs identiﬁed for each decision. For the 198 decisions with 2–40 relevant ICERs, the ICER used in each
of 100 iterations was randomly sampled by assigning equal probability to all ICERs that appeared from the
Guidance to have inﬂuenced the decision. For the 31 cases giving a range or lower/upper limit, ICER values
were sampled from a list of all ICERs within our data set that lay in the relevant range because ICERs follow
an unknown distribution and may approach inﬁnity (Briggs and Fenn, 1998). These sampling procedures
generated 100 data sets, each with different ICER data for those decisions with >1 relevant ICER.
Figure 1. Flow diagram of appraisals included in analysis
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Table I. Deﬁnition of variables included in the analysis
Variable name Coding Deﬁnition Justiﬁcation
Dependent variable
Recommendation 0 =Not recommended Whether or not NICE recommended the
technology for use in the population
considered in this decision.*
Main outcome
1 =Recommended
Independent variables included in model 1
ICER Numeric: £000s/QALY
gained
Value of the cost per QALY gained for
the technology considered in this
decision compared with a comparator
that NICE considered relevant to this
decision. The ICER(s) most relevant to
each decision were extracted for this
study (refer to Supporting Information).
NICE should consider “the broad
balance of clinical beneﬁts and costs”
and make decisions based on “clinical
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness”
(NICE, 2008).
Total_pts_in_RCTs Numeric: number of
patients
Equals number of RCTs evaluating
intervention in this population*
(including commercial in conﬁdence
trials*) multiplied by mean number of
patients in each fully reported RCT.*
Total_pts_in_RCTs equalled zero for
decisions with no RCTs.
“NICE should not recommend an
intervention […] if there is […] not
enough evidence” (NICE, 2008).
“RCTs are […] considered to be most
appropriate for measures of relative
treatment effect” (NICE, 2013).
Total_pts_in_RCTs was used to capture
both the number and size of trials
informing treatment effects.
Only_treatment 0 =Not only treatment Whether the technology (or all of the
technologies considered within the
same appraisal) comprises the only
treatment available for the condition
considered in this decision.*
Hypothesised that NICE is more likely
to recommend if no alternatives.1 =Only treatment for this
condition
Children 1 =Concerns children Whether the decision concerns use of
the treatment in children <18 years.
Based on the age group ﬁeld in
HTAinSite.*
Interventions for children are given ‘the
beneﬁt of the doubt’ as a result of
methodological challenges (Rawlins
et al., 2010).
0 =Does not concern
children
Pt_group_sub 1 = Patient group
submitted evidence
Whether any patient groups made a
submission to NICE in conjunction
with the appraisal.*
Proxy for stakeholder involvement.
0 =No patient group
submission
Date Numeric (years) Years elapsed between publication of
ﬁrst NICE appraisal in March 2000 and
publication of this appraisal.*
Evaluates whether NICE decision-
making is changing.
Severity Numeric: disutility scale Mean DALY weight across the diseases
considered in the 2004 Global Burden
of Disease study that fall into the
relevant main disease category (WHO,
2004). Severity was modelled in a
similar way by Linley and Hughes
(2012).
NICE state that they accept higher
ICERs for serious conditions (Rawlins
et al., 2010).
Additional variables explored in stage B and considered for inclusion in model 2
STA 1= STA Whether the appraisal was conducted via
the STA process or the MTA process.*
Mason and Drummond (2009)
suggested that NICE may be more
likely to say no in STAs.
0 =MTA
Pharmaceutical 1 = Pharmaceutical Whether the technology was a drug. Based
on the HTAinSite product type ﬁeld.*
May reﬂect degree of stakeholder
involvement.0 =Other technology
Orphan 1 =Orphan drug Whether the technology has been
granted orphan status by the EMEA.*
“NICE considers that it should evaluate
drugs to treat rare conditions, known as
‘orphan drugs’, in the same way as any
other treatment” (NICE, 2008;
Littlejohns and Rawlins, 2009).
0 =Not an orphan drug
No_SRs Numeric: number of
reviews
Number of systematic reviews
mentioned in the Guidance and
assessment report.*
Additional measure of clinical
evidence.
(Continues)
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Regression analyses included only decisions concerning treatments that are more costly and more effective
than their comparator. Sixty-four decisions for which all relevant ICERs indicated that the technology that was
either dominated or dominant relative to its comparator were excluded from regression analyses because dom-
inance perfectly predicted NICE recommendations. ICERs in the south-west quadrant of the cost-effectiveness
plane have the opposite interpretation to those in the north-east quadrant, and the two types of ICER data
cannot easily be combined without making value judgements about NICE’s preferences; we therefore also
excluded six decisions for which all ICERs lay in the south-west quadrant. Twenty-two decisions had ICERs
in >1 quadrant; these decisions were included in regression analyses in those data sets where a north-east
quadrant ICER was sampled and were dropped from regressions in data sets where an ICER from another
quadrant was sampled. As result, 440 decisions were included in regression analyses on ≥1 data set, although
the number of decisions included in each regression varied between 424 and 432 (mean = 428), depending on
the number of north-east quadrant ICERs in each data set.
Table I. (Continued)
Variable name Coding Deﬁnition Justiﬁcation
No_obs_studies Numeric: number of
studies
Number of non-randomised studies
mentioned in the Guidance and
assessment report.*
Additional measure of clinical
evidence.
PSA 1= PSA conducted Whether the uncertainty around the
economic evaluation was quantiﬁed
using PSA.*
Signiﬁcant predictor of AWMSG
decisions (Linley and Hughes, 2012).0 = PSA not conducted
Broader_perspective 1 =Considered broader
costs
Whether personal and societal costs
were considered in addition to NHS
cost (consideration included discussion
in the text as well as inclusion in
quantitative analyses).*
Reﬂects consideration of additional
costs or savings not captured in the base
case ICER.0 =NHS only
Disease Series of eight dummy
variables equal to 1 if
concerned that disease
Each decision was classed as one
disease category based on the ‘Main
disease category’ ﬁeld within
HTAinSite.* Disease categories with
less than 20 decisions with ICERs were
omitted. As result, decisions were
categorised into cancer, cardiovascular,
central nervous system, endocrine,
infectious disease, mental health,
musculoskeletal, respiratory and other.
May reﬂect variations in clinical need,
severity or importance of rule of rescue
between diseases, as well as different
political priorities.
Innovative 1 =Classed as innovative Any molecule launched within 2 years
of appraisal AND in an ATC4 class that
was created within 5 years of the
appraisal. Non-pharmaceutical
interventions were classed as non-
innovative.
For interventions with ICERs above
£20 000/QALY, the committee will
take account of “innovation that adds
demonstrable and distinct substantial
beneﬁts that may not have been
adequately captured in the measurement
of health gain” (NICE, 2008).
0 =Classed as non-
innovative
ICER_range Numeric: difference
between minimum and
maximum ICERs
For decisions with more than one north-
east quadrant ICER identiﬁed as driving
the decision, this equalled the difference
between the highest and lowest of such
ICERs. Range was set to 0 for decisions
with only 1 ICER.
For interventions with ICERs above
£20 000/QALY, NICE will be
“cautious about recommending a
technology when they are less certain
about the ICERs” (NICE, 2008).
*Data taken from HTAinSite (www.htainsite.com).
ATC4, Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical classiﬁcation system for drugs; AWMSG, All Wales Medicines Strategy Group; DALY, disabil-
ity-adjusted life-year; EMEA, European Medicines Agency; ICER, incremental cost-effectiveness ratio; MTA, multiple technology
appraisal; NHS, National Health Service; NICE; National Institute for Health and Care Excellence; PSA, probabilistic sensitivity analysis;
RCT randomised controlled trial; QALY, quality-adjusted life-year; SR, systematic review; STA, single technology appraisal; WHO,
World Health Organisation.
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2.3. Modelling approach
We modelled NICE decisions using logistic regression, which relates the probability (P) of a technology being
recommended by NICE (yi= 1) to a set of explanatory variables (xi) as follows:
Pðyi ¼ 1jxiÞ ¼
exp xiβð Þ
1þ exp xiβð Þ
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and presented as odds ratios: For example, a one unit change
in the jth variable, xj, is associated with the odds ratio, exp(βj).
Standard errors were adjusted for within-appraisal clustering of decisions because decisions concerning dif-
ferent drugs or patient populations within the same appraisal are made by the same committee on the same day
and are often based on similar or related evidence, so they are unlikely to be independent. All statistical anal-
yses were conducted in Stata Version 12.
Regression models were run separately on all 100 data sets with differing ICERs, and results were combined by
implementing Rubin’s rule (Carlin et al., 2008), which averages parameter estimates (e.g. regression coefﬁcients)
across multiple (imputed) data sets and adjusts standard errors to allow for uncertainty around ICER values.
2.4. Model selection
The primary measure of model performance comprised the proportion of decisions that were correctly classiﬁed
because it is not valid to apply Rubin’s rule to the measures of model ﬁt or likelihood, such as pseudo-R2 and
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC; White et al., 2011). Ideally, the proportion of correctly predicted outcomes
would be based on a validation sample independent of the data used to estimate the model (Copas, 1983). Unfor-
tunately, this was not feasible because of the limited number of appraisals available; we therefore rely on a single
data set to both estimate and assess model performance, which may result in overly optimistic results.
The proportion of NICE decisions correctly predicted, together with the speciﬁcity (the proportion of ‘no’
decisions predicted as ‘no’) and sensitivity (the proportion of ‘yes’ decisions predicted as ‘yes’), was calculated
by assuming that all technologies with ≥50% predicted probability of success would be recommended by
NICE. Pseudo-R2 and AIC calculated from the mean log-likelihood for the best models (averaged across all
data sets) are also shown for illustration, although these ﬁgures should be interpreted with caution.
Our analyses were primarily exploratory and aimed to identify which factors are most inﬂuential and the best
way to input each factor. We therefore explored a wide range of model speciﬁcations in four stages, which were
used to determine the speciﬁcation of models 2–4. In stages B and C, prediction accuracy was compared be-
tween models and the model with the highest proportion of decisions correctly classiﬁed was taken forward
to the next stage.
(A) Evaluation of model 1, which included only the seven variables that we predicted, a priori, to have the
most effect on NICE decisions (Table I).
(B) Identiﬁcation of additional variables explaining NICE decision-making. We added additional indepen-
dent variables into model 1 to assess whether they improved prediction accuracy and/or had a signif-
icant effect on NICE decisions and removed variables from model 1 one at a time to identify those
which best explained NICE decisions. All the variables that improved prediction accuracy when con-
sidered individually were then evaluated simultaneously in model 2. Those variables that were statis-
tically signiﬁcant were included in model 3.
(C) Alternative speciﬁcations: We then varied the speciﬁcation of the variables in model 2 to evaluate the
effect that this has on the proportion of decisions that are correctly classiﬁed and the statistical signif-
icance of this parameterisation. Alternative speciﬁcations (e.g. interactions or squared terms) were con-
sidered for each variable (refer to Supporting Information); the speciﬁcation for each variable that had
highest prediction accuracy when considered individually was included in model 4.
(D) Sensitivity and subgroup analyses: conducted on model 4 (refer to Supporting Information).
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Models 1–4 were compared against a model including only the ICER (model 5). Methods similar to those
described by Devlin and Parkin (2004) were used to estimate the ICER at which there is a 25, 50 or 75% chance
of a positive NICE recommendation. The predicted log-odds of NICE saying ‘yes’ was calculated for different
ICER values by multiplying the vector of estimated coefﬁcients by the vector of mean values for other explan-
atory variables and the ICER value of interest. Similar ﬁgures were estimated for particular types of decisions
(e.g. those on cancer) by repeating calculations using values of zero and one for that dummy variable in place of
its mean. The predicted probability of NICE rejection was plotted against ICER and compared against the
sigmoid curve proposed by Rawlins and Culyer (2004).
3. RESULTS
3.1. Exploratory data analysis
Our data set comprised 763 decisions from 229 appraisals (Figure 1). Of these, 253 decisions that did not report
any usable ICERs were omitted from regression analyses:
a) Seventy decisions were ‘no’ as a result of of clinical evidence; these decisions had signiﬁcantly fewer
patients in RCTs (p< 0.001) than other decisions (Table II), although 59% (41/70) were nonetheless
supported by ≥1 RCT.
b) Sixty-three decisions were ‘yes’ on clinical grounds (e.g. because all alternative technologies were con-
traindicated or not tolerated), while 28 decisions were ‘no’ on clinical grounds (e.g. because treatment
was ‘clinically inappropriate’ in that patient group). The decisions made on clinical grounds were, on
average, published 2 years earlier than the average decision based on cost-effectiveness (p< 0.001),
had less RCT evidence (p = 0.006) and were more likely to be for children (p< 0.001), although the
characteristics were otherwise similar (Table II).
c) One hundred seventy-four decisions that appear to have been based on cost-effectiveness did not have
available north-east quadrant ICERs. For 39 of these decisions, cost-utility analysis was not undertaken,
although another form of economic evaluation was done (e.g. cost-effectiveness analysis calculating the
cost/life-year gained). A further 36 decisions made broad references to the committee’s judgements
about cost-effectiveness, but no speciﬁc ICERs were quoted or identiﬁed; this included statements
that the ICER ‘approaches inﬁnity’ or was ‘likely to be cost-effective’. Seventeen decisions were
based on cost/QALY ICERs that were not available for analysis (e.g. because they were commercial
in conﬁdence or the guidance document was unavailable). Thirty-three decisions were ‘no’ as treat-
ment was dominated by its comparator, while 31 were ‘yes’ as treatment dominated. Six decisions
had ICERs in the south-west quadrant, of which one was ‘no’. As discussed in Section 2.2, we
allowed for decisions with >1 relevant ICER by sampling 100 data sets with different ICER values
for these decisions. On average across the 100 data sets, a further 12 decisions were excluded from
regression analyses because non-north-east quadrant ICERs were sampled from a set of relevant
ICERs spanning >1 quadrant. The 174 decisions based on cost-effectiveness that lacked available
north-east quadrant cost/QALY ICERs tended to be published about 4 years earlier than those
included in regression analyses (p< 0.001) and were less likely to be single technology appraisals
(STAs; p< 0.001) or only treatments (p< 0.001).
Among the 428 decisions with available north-east quadrant ICERs, ICERs differed signiﬁcantly between
‘yes’ and ‘no’ decisions (p< 0.001; Table II). Exploratory data analysis also demonstrated that the proportion
of technologies rejected by NICE increases substantially with ICER (particularly at ~£27 500 and ~£47 500/
QALY), although there are numerous exceptions (Figure 2).
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Figure 2. Impact of ICER ranking on recommendations. Decisions are ranked by ICER, with NICE decisions to ‘recommend’ shown in
blue and to ‘reject’ shown in red. For clarity, only the ﬁrst ﬁve data sets of randomly sampled ICERs are shown
Table III. Prediction accuracy and model ﬁt for models 1–5
Model name
% correctly
classiﬁed Sensitivity Speciﬁcity
Mean
AIC*
Mean adjusted
pseudo-R2*
Cost/QALY at which
probability of a NICE
recommendation is
50% (25, 75%)†
1: ICER, Date, Total_pts_in_RCTs,
Children, Only_treatment,
Pt_group_sub and Severity
82.46% 94.02% 58.90% 338 0.336 £43 356 (£58 793,
£27 936)
2: ICER, Total_pts_in_RCTs,
Only_treatment, Children,
Pt_Group_Sub, Date, STA, Orphan,
No_SRs, No_obs_studies, PSA,
Cancer, Cardiovascular, Infectious,
Musculoskeletal, Respiratory,
ICER_range, Innovative (model with
best prediction accuracy after Stage B)
84.67% 93.18% 67.35% 265 0.417 £39 479 (£53 616,
£25 358)
3: ICER, Musculoskeletal, Respiratory,
Cancer (variables signiﬁcant in at least
one analysis in stages A and B)
83.50% 93.74% 62.66% 332 0.362 £42 391 (£57 021,
£27 781)
4: ICER, Total_RCTs,
Mean_pts_per_RCT,
Only_treatmentifICER> 30k,
Children, Pt_group_sub,
ICER*Pt_group_sub, 11 dummies for
publication year, STA, PSA, Orphan,
No_SRs, No_obs_studies, Cancer,
Cardiovascular, Infectious,
Musculoskeletal, Respiratory,
ICER_range, Innovative, (model with
best prediction accuracy after stage C)
87.18% 94.24% 72.80% 217 0.447 £39 417 (£51 754,
£27 047)
5: ICER only 82.00% 93.30% 58.99% 357 0.332 £43 949 (£60 377,
£27 548)
*Mean AIC and pseudo-R2 are shown for illustration only. Models were estimated separately for each of 100 data sets with ICERs sampled
from the list of those relevant to each decision; the log-pseudo-likelihood for the model (LLM) and for the constant-only model (LL0) were
averaged over the 100 data sets. AIC was calculated manually from the mean log-likelihood as 2LLM+2k and adjusted pseudo-R2 was
calculated as 1 (LLM / LL0) × ((n 1) / (n k)), where k= number of model parameters (explanatory variables plus constant) and n=
number of decisions.
†The mean values for all other model parameters were multiplied by model coefﬁcients to calculate the predicted log-odds of a positive
NICE recommendation at a range of ICER values; the resulting ﬁgures were used to identify the ICER at which the probability of NICE
saying ‘yes’ equalled 25, 50 and 75%.
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3.2. Factors affecting NICE decisions
Model 1 evaluated the impact of the seven variables considered most likely to inﬂuence NICE decision-making
(Tables III and IV). This model ﬁtted the data well (mean adjusted pseudo-R2 = 0.34) and correctly classiﬁed
82.5% of NICE decisions (Table III). As expected, the ICER had a signiﬁcant effect on NICE decisions, with
every £1000 increase in the ICER reducing the odds of NICE recommending the technology by 6.9% (95%
conﬁdence interval (CI): 4.3, 9.4%; p< 0.001; Table IV).
However, clinical evidence, having no alternative treatments, paediatric population, patient group submis-
sion, disease severity and date had no signiﬁcant effect on NICE decisions (p≥ 0.29; Table IV). Nonetheless,
omitting any variable from the model other than disease severity slightly reduced prediction accuracy, suggest-
ing that these variables may help explain some NICE decisions.
Taking account of 12 of the 17 additional variables evaluated in stage B slightly improved prediction accu-
racy. Model 2 (Table IV) therefore included these variables, in addition to all variables from model 1 other than
severity (which was omitted to improve prediction accuracy). Model 2 correctly classiﬁed 84.67% of NICE
decisions: a small improvement on model 1 (Table III).
There were also marked differences in the probability of NICE rejection between diseases. The odds of a
positive NICE recommendation were 5.7-fold higher (p=0.007; 95% CI: 1.6, 20.3) for musculoskeletal disease
interventions, 3.1-fold higher (p= 0.029; 95% CI: 1.1, 8.4) for interventions treating, preventing or diagnosing
cancer and 71% lower (p=0.037; 95% CI: 7, 91%) for interventions for respiratory disease. Model 4 gave
similar ﬁndings (Supporting Information).
These ﬁndings were largely conﬁrmed by model 3, which included only statistically signiﬁcant variables
(ICER, musculoskeletal disease, cancer and respiratory disease), although omitting the non-signiﬁcant variables
reduced prediction accuracy to 83.5% and reduced the magnitude of the coefﬁcients for each of the three diseases,
such that cancer and musculoskeletal disease had no statistically signiﬁcant effect at the 5% level (p≥ 0.103).
The impact of end of life criteria was evaluated in a subset of appraisals published after these criteria were
introduced in January 2009 (NICE, 2009). This suggested that interventions meeting the end of life criteria
were 3.4-fold more likely (p = 0.15; 95% CI: 0.64, 17.9) to be recommended by NICE than those that did
not meet the criteria. A sensitivity analysis found that allowing for the committee making NICE
Table IV. Coefﬁcients from models 1 and 2
Variable
Odds ratio (95% CI)
Model 1 Model 2
ICER (£’000s) 0.931 (0.906, 0.957)** 0.925 (0.893, 0.959)**
Total_pts_in_RCTs 1.000 (1.000, 1.000) 1.000 (1.000, 1.000)
Only_treatment (dummy) 2.499 (0.457, 13.667) 4.279 (0.696, 26.297)
Children (dummy) 2.390 (0.312, 18.308) 4.097 (0.384, 43.740)
Pt_group_sub (dummy) 0.962 (0.097, 9.571) 1.119 (0.132, 9.498)
Date (years) 1.062 (0.943, 1.195) 1.134 (0.947, 1.357)
Severity (DALY weights) 0.397 (0.025, 6.362) —
STA (dummy) — 0.426 (0.185, 0.975)**
PSA (dummy) — 0.443 (0.155, 1.271)
Orphan (dummy) — 0.630 (0.144, 2.759)
No_SRs — 1.024 (0.928, 1.130)
No_obs_studies — 1.121 (0.991, 1.268)*
Cancer (dummy) — 3.063 (1.119, 8.383)**
Cardiovascular (dummy) — 0.837 (0.291, 2.401)
Infectious (dummy) — 2.209 (0.359, 13.594)
Musculoskeletal (dummy) — 5.732 (1.615, 20.343)**
Respiratory (dummy) — 0.288 (0.089, 0.927)**
ICER_range (£’000s) — 1.000 (1.000, 1.000)*
Innovative (dummy) — 1.701 (0.656, 4.411)
*p< 0.10;
**p< 0.05
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recommendations slightly improved prediction accuracy, although there were no statistically signiﬁcant
differences between committees.
However, overall, the impact of additional variables on prediction accuracy was very small, with no variable
increasing prediction accuracy by more than one percentage point. Indeed, omitting all variables except the
ICER correctly classiﬁed 82% of NICE decisions (Table III, model 5). By contrast, omitting the ICER from
model 2 suggests that the other variables would correctly classify only 73.1% of NICE decisions.
3.3. Relationship between ICER and probability of NICE recommendation
Coefﬁcients from models 1–5 were used to estimate how the probability of NICE rejection varied with ICER,
holding all other parameters at mean values (Figure 3, Table III). The ICER at which the average product had a
50% chance of rejection decreased as additional variables were taken into account, from £43 949 for model 5
(which considered only the ICER) to £39 417 for model 4 (Table III, Figure 3). The interaction between ICER
and patient group submission also increased the gradient for model 4, such that the probability of NICE rejec-
tion increases over a narrower range of ICERs.
However, although the choice of model had relatively little effect on the relationship between ICER and rec-
ommendation when other variables were held at their mean value, varying the values of other variables often
produced substantial shifts in the curve. For example, for model 4, the ICER at which the probability of NICE
saying ‘yes’ was 50% was £20 356/QALY for respiratory disease, £37 950 for cardiovascular disease, £46 082
for cancer, £49 292 for infectious disease, £55 512 for musculoskeletal disease, and £32 263 for other diseases.
The decisions that were poorly predicted by our models were generally rejected because of substantial uncer-
tainty or included statements within the guidance suggesting that the committee believed the ICER to be at/near
the top or bottom of the stated range. This is supported by a sensitivity analysis using the minimum ICER for all
‘yes’ decisions and the maximum ICER for all ‘no’ decisions, which correctly classiﬁed 93.0% of decisions; this
may suggest that around two-thirds of the decisions poorly predicted by our model are misclassiﬁed because of
difﬁculties identifying the ICER that drove the committee’s decision based on secondary data.
3.4. Has NICE’s threshold changed over time?
Model 1 suggested that publication date had no signiﬁcant effect on NICE decisions (p=0.31) and estimated that the
odds of a positive NICE recommendation increased by 6% (95% CI: 5, 19%) per year between 2000 and 2011.
Similarly, although inﬂation will also affect the real value of any ceiling ratio, inﬂating ICERs to 2011/2012 values
using the hospital and community health service pay and price index (Curtis, 2012) reduced prediction accuracy. We
Figure 3. Predicted probability of NICE rejections at different ICER values for models 1–5, holding all other variables at mean levels
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examined alternative speciﬁcations of publication date to assess the impact on prediction accuracy, although no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant temporal trends were observed.
4. DISCUSSION
4.1. Implications for understanding how NICE weighs up beneﬁts and costs
Our analyses demonstrate that cost-effectiveness is the principal determinant of most NICE decisions and that
the probability of rejection increases signiﬁcantly with increasing ICER. The ﬁnding was robust to extensive
sensitivity analyses varying modelling approaches.
The relationship between ICER and the probability of NICE rejection appears to follow a sigmoid curve with points
of inﬂexion. However, the data support neither the £5000–£15 000/QALY and £25, 000–£35, 000/QALY inﬂexion
points proposed by Rawlins and Culyer (2004) nor NICE’s stated threshold range. Based on NICE (2008, 2013)
statements, we would expect the following: for ICERs under £20 000/QALY, the probability of rejection would
be <0.5; above £30 000/QALY, it would be >0.5; and the switch from odds-on to odds-against would be some-
where in between. We estimate that, in practice, the ICER at which the probability switches from more-likely-to-
accept to more-likely-to-reject is between £39 000 and £44 000: well above the stated £20 000–£30 000 range.
It is informative to compare our estimates with emerging evidence on what the cost-effectiveness threshold
should be. Claxton et al. (2013) and Appleby et al. (2009) adopt an opportunity cost deﬁnition of the threshold,
while Baker et al. (2010) provide estimates of the social value of a QALY. While NICE formally subscribes to
an opportunity cost deﬁnition, our results clearly show that, in practice, NICE often recommends technologies
with ICERs that are well above the opportunity cost estimate of Claxton et al. (2013) but somewhat closer to
the social value of a QALY (Baker et al., 2010).
4.2. Temporal trends and impact of other factors
Although allowing for temporal trends improved model performance, time had no signiﬁcant effect on NICE
decisions and the relationship we estimate between cost-effectiveness and NICE decisions between 1999 and
2011 is remarkably similar to that reported by Devlin and Parkin (2004) for the years 1999–2002, despite the many
changes in NHS budgets, prices and productivity in the intervening 7 years. Although the models reported here
treat ICERs in nominal terms, inﬂation must have affected the prices and costs embodied in the ICERs in appraisals
conducted over this 10-year period; nevertheless, inﬂation-adjusting ICERs reduced model performance.
The single factor other than cost-effectiveness that emerged from our analyses as exerting a signiﬁcant effect on de-
cisions is the type of disease that the technology is intended to prevent, diagnose or treat. NICE rejections were signiﬁ-
cantly less likely for cancer and musculoskeletal disease but more likely for respiratory disease. It is unclear whether
such trends reﬂect a causative relationship between disease and NICE decisions (e.g. driven by political priorities, the
shadow price of a QALY and/or willingness to pay) or whether it reﬂects selection of topics or other characteristics of
the decisions within each disease area. The ﬁnding for cancer was clearest before the end of life guidance was introduced,
with 75% (49/65) of cancer decisions before January 2009 being ‘yes’, versus 46% (24/52) after; however, the end of life
guidancemay have simply formalised something that NICEwas already taking into account. Other than certain diseases,
no variables other than cost-effectiveness signiﬁcantly predicted NICE decisions. However, the relevance of statistical
signiﬁcance is unclear when the sample includes the whole ‘population’ of NICE decisions published before 2012.
NICE’s appraisal process is intended to reﬂect and incorporate multiple criteria, but the effect on decisions
of criteria other than cost-effectiveness is not readily detectable; it could therefore be argued that NICE should
be more transparent about the criteria being used and the importance attached to these (Devlin and Sussex,
2011). However, others argue that a deliberative process without pre-deﬁned weights is needed to consider
the evidence and make complex decisions (Culyer and Lomas, 2006).
However, it is possible that NICE took account of other factors that cannot easily be deﬁned or quantiﬁed
were not explicitly noted in the Guidance, or were one-off considerations speciﬁc to particular decisions. In
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particular, our descriptive analysis suggests that 21% (161/763) of decisions are based on clinical consider-
ations or lack of clinical evidence without considering cost-effectiveness. The inﬂuence of additional factors
not evaluated in our analysis that affect decisions with cost-effectiveness evidence would have biased upwards
our estimate of the ICER at which the probability of rejection is 50%.
Several factors that NICE says inﬂuence its decisions are difﬁcult empirically to deﬁne and measure. For
example, although severity is said to inﬂuence NICE decisions (Rawlins et al., 2010), NICE Guidance does
not state whether the condition was considered to be ‘severe’ and in the absence of a precise deﬁnition of ‘se-
verity’, it is difﬁcult for researchers to judge ex post which technologies would be deemed to fall into that cat-
egory; the measure we used (mean disability-adjusted life-year weight across broad disease categories) may not
adequately represent the way NICE committees consider severity. ‘Innovation’ presents a similar challenge, as
do other criteria (e.g. disadvantaged populations) that we were not able to explore.
Budget impact, population size and media noise might arguably be relevant to understanding and explaining
NICE decisions but were not included in our analysis. One argument for excluding budget impact is that NICE
is not meant to take that into account. We would have liked to test this hypothesis rather than assume that it has
no impact. However, budget impact and population size estimates are only recorded for whole TAs based on
the patient subgroups for which treatment was recommended; estimating the net budget impact and population
size for each decision would be a substantial task, beyond the scope of this project.
Although we explored measures of clinical evidence and uncertainty, this was not entirely satisfactory and
remains to be properly captured both conceptually and empirically. Devlin and Parkin (2004) expressed similar
reservations about the variable that they included to capture the ICER range. Amongst the complexities in
representing uncertainty around the ICER is that it may be because of the uncertainty around costs, QALYs,
or both. QALY uncertainty could arise from many different sources, such as insufﬁcient trial evidence (which
might be captured by Total_pts_in_RCTs) or structural model assumptions (e.g. around extrapolation). NICE
might, in principle, react differently to these different sources of uncertainty. The way in which uncertainty in-
formation is presented to NICE committees might also affect decisions. We considered using a variable esti-
mated from conﬁdence intervals or cost-effectiveness acceptability curves but rejected this because that
would require further value judgements and/or exclusion of 126 decisions where probabilistic sensitivity anal-
ysis was not undertaken.
4.3. Conclusions
Our main result, based on a larger number of decisions than previous studies (Devlin and Parkin, 2004; Dakin
et al., 2006; Cerri et al., 2014), conﬁrm their conclusions that cost-effectiveness is the major driver of NICE de-
cisions. However, although we explored the impact of a wide range of potential predictors, we did not replicate
their ﬁndings with respect to other important factors. No other factors besides the type of condition had a signif-
icant effect on NICE decisions, although allowing for clinical evidence, alternative treatments, paediatric popula-
tion, patient group involvement, publication date, type of process (STA versus multiple technology appraisal),
orphan status, innovation and uncertainty improved prediction accuracy. NICE frequently recommends technol-
ogies with ICERs considerably higher than its stated £20 000–£30 000/QALY threshold range.
However, the analysis relied upon judgements about which ICER(s) were taken into account in each NICE
decision and our conclusions are based on the assumption that we have identiﬁed the ‘correct’ model. Further
work is required to explore the impact of uncertainty, severity, innovation and equity on NICE decisions and to
explore the structure of NICE decision-making using sequential models.
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